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ABSTRACT PAGE
This Masters Thesis explores the behavior of the Albany County Commission for Detecting 
and Defeating Conspiracies during the American Revolution. Albany, New York, was 
divided ethnically and politically at the onset of the war. The Commission for Detecting and 
Defeating Conspiracies was a Patriot body created to shape a loyal American populace out 
of a disparate group of colonials.
This paper examines the methods that the Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies employed to determine the loyalties of the population. It enacted oaths of 
allegiance, implemented recognizance and bail, and exile, to create a  Patriot community. In 
doing so, the Commission excised people who challenged the legitimacy of the revolution, 
thereby gaining authority and power for the burgeoning American government in New York.
The Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies 
Albany County, New York: 1778-1781
Introduction
Edward Countryman, a very accomplished historian has written that “revolution is 
perhaps the most complicated concept in the modem historian’s vocabulary.” 1 Precisely 
because it is so hard to define many historians have debated the nature o f the American 
Revolution. Fomenting a rebellion among thirteen disparate colonies, unifying the resistance 
to imperial oppression, and forging a new continental identity is perpetuated in the origin 
myths of the United States. For all the intellectual and social fervor for which the 
Revolutionary era seems fraught, one o f the most under-studied aspects o f the Revolution is 
the Patriot committee-system. Networks o f town, county, and state-wide committees fanned 
out across the British continent to unify colonial resistance, implement an effective governing 
system, and legitimize the burgeoning Patriot government.
The methods these committees utilized in New York, the subject o f my thesis, to 
implement and legitimize the Patriot government were also used to shape and define the 
revolutionary movement. The simultaneous creation o f the American community with the 
foundational political ideology o f the new nation reveals the jagged edges o f the social, 
political, and military changes the country underwent. Changes were slow to manifest 
themselves in Albany, New York, and the speed with which they were introduced and 
accepted into the countryside seems glacial until actual physical violence presented itself on 
the landscape. The daily mediation o f tradition, personal interest, political affiliation, and 
ethnic identity, with the threat o f violent British occupation and Native American guerrilla 
warfare, altered the climate o f upstate New York. As the implications o f open rebellion swept
1 Edward Countryman. “Consolidating Power in Revolutionary America: The Case o f New 
York, 1775-1783.” Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History, No. 4. (1976): 645-677, 647.
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towards Albany, competing factions emerged to ensure the smooth operation o f the civic 
sphere. The commercial and physical safety o f the community came into conflict with the 
idealized political orientation o f Albany. The Anglo-American population superseded the 
Dutch and Native American parties, both economically and politically, to create the surface 
appearance o f Tories versus Whigs in the town government. A closer examination o f the local 
governing structures that emerged during the Revolution reveals a polychotomous society 
with far more complex political affiliations than Tory and Whig, Loyalist and Patriot.
The committee system in upstate New York has been neglected in the historiography 
o f the American Revolution. Not since Alexander C. Flick’s 1926 classic The American 
Revolution in New York: Its Political, Social and Economic Significance has the committee 
system been examined closely. This study focuses on just one o f the many committees in 
operation between the 1760s and 1790s. The Committee for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies in Albany, New York, was begun in 1776 to ferret out people inimical to the 
American cause. This committee lasted at least through 1781, although some financial records 
indicate that some form o f this body was continued through 1789.2 The primary source for 
this commission is the Minutes o f  the Commissioners fo r  Detecting and Defeating  
Conspiracies in the State o f  New York Albany County Sessions, 1778-1781. These Minutes 
magnify the daily challenges o f  perpetual definition and re-definition o f  the self, the 
community, the government, and the relationships that bound all together during the war.
The first section o f this paper addresses A lbany’s origins and its situation at the 
beginning o f the American Revolution. Albany is a unique site for study because o f its 
ethnically diverse composition, yet the Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies 
reveals only one level o f revolution in this community— a political superstructure operating
2 Victor Hugo Paltsits. Minutes o f  the Commissioners fo r  Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies in the State o f  New York: 1778-1781. (Albany; NY State Press, 1909), 830-827. 
An examination o f the financial appendices reveals that commissioners and rangers were 
being paid for actives services well into 1784. Later dates often reflect payment for services 
rendered during the late-1770s and early 1780s. Financial auditing o f this commission’s 
records, by the New York State Legislature, may have continued until 1789.
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on Anglo-American principles o f governance. The second section o f the paper examines the 
rise o f the committee system in Albany and seeks to provide a larger context for the 
conspiracy commission. The years 1774-1775 brought a fledgling committee system into 
existence; one that was unsure o f where it derived its legitimacy and how much authority it 
could exercise. The point o f the committee system was to assign a special group o f people a 
limited agenda to pursue. Ideally an efficient government would result from all the 
committees operating in a tandem.
It was not until the Declaration o f Independence that loyalties became more finite.
♦
By 1776, the New York committee system needed a specific body to determine the political 
loyalties o f  the population. The creation o f the commission and the legislation that enabled the 
operation o f this body is explored in the third part o f the paper. The final section analyzes the 
methods that the Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies employed to 
determine the loyalties o f the population. It enacted oaths o f allegiance, implemented 
recognizance and bail, and finally, exile, to create a Patriot community. In doing so, the 
Commission excised people who challenged the legitimacy o f  the revolution, thereby gaining 
authority and power for the burgeoning American government in New York.
Origins of a Revolutionary City: Albany, New York
Albany, at the time o f the American Revolution, was neither a frontier nor a 
metropolis. It was situated at the awkward point o f development where it was commercially 
successful, but still a country backwater. It was a large town, ethnically and religiously 
diverse, but lacked the amenities o f a city like New York. Much o f its social development was 
stalled between the traditional Dutch town based on commerce and trade, and the new 
agricultural settlers, largely from within the British Empire and from Germany.
Albany is located about 150 miles north o f New York City on the Hudson River and 
was settled by the Dutch West India Company as a fur-trading outpost called Fort Orange in
3
1624.3 The first few years o f  settlement were fraught with tensions between Native Americans 
and the settlers, but trade and commerce were established as the lynchpin o f this society. The 
Dutch were able to negotiate the Chain o f Friendship Treaty with the Mahicans in 1642, 
which relied on a delicate balance o f respect and reciprocity to maintain peace. Yet the 
imperial ambitions o f England soon forced the Netherlands to increase the population o f its 
North American colonies to prevent the English from expanding their New England colonies 
into Dutch territory.4
By 1650, New Netherlands was booming by the standards o f its day. New 
Amsterdam was ethnically and religiously diverse, and commercially prosperous. Fort Orange 
was much smaller, but controlled the most profitable trade in North America, beaver fur. 
Through a series o f Anglo-Dutch wars, both in the new and old worlds, between 1652 and 
1672, the English and the Dutch alternately occupied Albany. It ultimately became an English 
possession in 1673 and remained so until the American Revolution.5
Donna Merwick, one o f the foremost historians o f colonial, Dutch, New York, 
argues that while the Dutch nominally accepted English rule, they also ridiculed it. She points 
to the overrepresentation o f Dutch in court cases in which people were charged with contempt 
o f authority and also to burlesque representations o f English militarism and violence against 
natives.6 Merwick argues that King Philip’s and King W illiam ’s wars set the Dutch at odds 
with English rule. In both cases the Dutch adhered to their alliances with Native Americans 
and continued to trade with the enemies o f the English during the war. This practice enraged
3 There had been Dutch activity in the area o f Albany since at least 1614. Some historians 
argue that the French had a short-lived trading post at the same location as early as 1540. 
Throughout it appears that Iroquois, Mahicans, and other local tribes used this area at least 
seasonally. See Charlotte Wilcoxen, Seventeenth Century Albany: A Dutch Profile. (Albany, 
NY: 1984), 4. W ilcoxen notes that Native Americans are thought to have inhabited the site 
prior to Dutch settlement and that Mahicans lived adjacent to Ft. Orange for the first ten or so 
years o f  Dutch settlement.
4 Alice P. Kenney. Stubborn fo r  Liberty: The Dutch in New York. (Syracuse, 1975), 26.
5 Kenney, Stubborn fo r  Liberty, 53.
6 Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany: 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences. 
(Cambridge, 2003), 273-275.
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the English but the Dutch found the English wars to be unrelated to their economic 
incentives.7
The Anglo-Dutch experience in Albany was complicated between 1690 and 1720 by 
Palatine German immigration into the upper Schoharie and northern Mohawk river valleys.8 
German land patents were granted and settled from Schenectady (20 miles from Albany) to 
German Flats (130 miles away) and even as far north as Fort Stanwix, Herkimer, and 
Oriskany (100 miles distant). Just south o f the German patents, settlers from the English 
empire were moving into lands directly west o f Albany, pushing against what would become 
the Fort Stanwix Treaty Line o f 1765 and filling in the Susquehanna River Valley.9
In the meantime Irish, Scots-Irish, and Scottish, mainly Presbyterians, settled in 
Albany County, as well as the upper Susquehanna valley, mainly Cherry Valley, west o f 
Albany. By 1760, there were sizable land grants to the north o f Albany, settled by people who 
were nominally a part o f the English empire, but given their own colonial experiences, o f 
dubious loyalty to the Crown. By 1760, tensions between Native Americans and these new 
settlers resulted in violence; raids, forced removals, and retaliation were common outside of 
Albany.
Little is known about Anglo-Dutch relations and the processes o f assimilation in 
Albany between 1720 and 1760. No major study has been undertaken to determine the social 
aspects o f Albany during this time, although much use has been made o f land records and 
genealogical information. Travelogues provide the best description o f the city in the years 
leading up to the Revolution, and reveal more about the biases o f the authors than how the 
town may have functioned. Lord Adam Gordon was a Scottish military official assigned to
7 Merwick. Possessing Albany, 281-282.
8 Ruth L. Higgins. Expansion in New York with Especial Reference to the Eighteenth Century. 
(Columbus, Oh; 1931), 47-56.
9 Higgins, Expansion in New York, 56-82.
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Jamaica who began a tour o f  North America in 1765. He traveled from Florida up the east 
coast, stopping in Albany on his way to Canada before returning to Jam aica.10
Gordon records seeing the “pleasantest soil in the world,” and notes the “mostly 
Dutch and German” settlements along the river.11 “There is an old stone fort at Albany and a 
stockade, also a large hospital, barracks, and storehouses, but being built o f wood and in a 
hurry, they are like every other public work in America going fast to ruin.” 12 He observes that 
“the people o f Albany are mostly descended o f low Dutch and carry down with them the true 
characteristic marks o f their native country, viz. an unwearied attention to their own personal 
and particular interests, and an abhorrence to all superior powers.” 13 In the same sentence, 
Lord Gordon points out that the late Stamp Act riots had nearly destroyed all the buildings in 
town, but the site was also o f great strategic value located on the Hudson and Mohawk rivers. 
He observed “the town itself is dull and ill-built, having the gable end o f their houses all to the 
streets, which are very dirty and crooked and confined by the rising grounds, close behind the 
town.” 14
Gordon reveals that there was still a noticeable Dutch element in the town and that 
the town was not metropolitan in the way Boston or Philadelphia were perceived.15 Gordon 
called Philadelphia “one o f the wonders o f the world, if you consider its size, the number of 
inhabitants, the regularity o f  its streets, their great breadth and length, their cutting one 
another all at right angles, their spacious public and private buildings, quays and docks, the 
magnificence and diversity o f places o f w orship... the plenty o f provisions brought to market,
10 Howard H. Peckham, ed. Narratives o f  Colonial America: 1704-1765, (Chicago, 1971). 
Gordon was in Maryland at the beginning o f May, see 255.
11 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 268.
12 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 269.
13 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 269.
14 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 269.
15 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 292. In Boston, he praises the fruitful lands and 
notes “the men here resembles so much the people o f Old England, from whence most o f 
them are sprung...[yet he decries] the leveling principle here everywhere operates strongly 
and takes the lead. Everybody has property and everybody knows it.” If one wanted to learn 
about the beautiful women o f Rhode Island, Gordon spends a page extolling their virtues, but 
nothing so exciting caught his attention in Albany.
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and the industry o f all its inhabitants.” 16 Gordon praises it as the “first town in America” and
“bids fair to rival almost any in Europe.” 17 With competition like Philadelphia, it is little
wonder that in the 1760s A lbany’s crooked little streets and Dutch inhabitants were not given
much attention by contemporaries.
Fortunately for Albany, Richard Smith, a New Jersey resident and land speculator,
decided to keep a journal o f his 1769 travels in the river valleys o f  New York and
Pennsylvania. Smith was more enchanted with the people on the landscape than was Gordon;
he notes “a person in the act o f sowing Peas upon a fruitful Meadow o f an Island” as well as
“good” houses and “brick” houses o f the gentry.18 Smith wrote
In the afternoon we viewed the Town which contains according to several 
gentlemen residing here, about 500 Dwelling Houses besides stores and Out 
Houses. The streets are irregular and badly laid out, some paved others not,
Two or Three are broad [,] the rest narrow & not straight. Most o f the 
Buildings are pyramidically shaped like old Dutch Houses in N York. We 
found Cartw right’s a good Tavern tho his charges were exorbitant.19 
Smith also recorded that he agreed with Peter Kalm, a Swedish visitor to America between
1748 and 1751, “that the Townsmen o f Albany in general sustained the character o f being
close, mercenary and avaricious.”20 What type o f people inhabited Albany that visitors to the
city noted only such nasty qualities?
Smith observed that there were no “extraordinary Edifices in the Town nor is there a
single Building facing Albany on the other Side o f the River.” He also shared Gordon’s
concerns about the condition o f the buildings in town “the Fort is in a ruinous neglected
Condition and nothing now to be seen o f Fort Orange built by the Dutch but part o f the Fosse
or Ditch which surrounded. The Barracks are built o f Wood and o f ordinary Worksmanship;
16 Peckham, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 259.
17 Peckahm, Narratives o f  Colonial America, 259-260.
18 Richard Smith. A Tour o f  the Hudson, the Mohawk, the Susquehanna, and the Delaware in 
1769: Being the Journal o f  Richard Smith o f  Burlington, New Jersey. (New York, 1989), 81- 
82.
19 Smith, A Tour o f  the Hudson, 82.
20 Smith, A Tour o f  the Hudson, 82.
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the same may lje said o f the King’s Store Houses.”21 He claimed that “the Inhabitants 
generally speak both Dutch and English & some do not understand the latter.”22
The Albany o f  Sm ith’s visit had a public library, hospital, court house, jail, four 
“houses o f W orship,” a shoe warehouse, a lumber industry, and a town clock. He also noted 
that the houses were often made o f brick, white pine with red or black tiles, and in the fashion 
o f New York City had Linden, or Lime, trees planted at their front doors.23 Smith’s visit 
revealed more o f the metropolitan connection that Albany had to the Anglo-inspired 
architecture and town layout. At the end o f the 1760’s Albany was a bustling town o f about 
4000 (compared to New York at about 13,000 and Philadelphia and Boston at about 6000 
each).24
Lord Gordon observed in his diary that the K ing’s warehouses had nearly been 
burned down during the Stamp Act riots. This was probably the work o f the Sons of Liberty 
or the local mechanics society. Due to the existence o f the Constitution o f the Sons o f Liberty 
o f Albany,-it is known that Albany was politically active from the outset o f the troubles with 
England. The Constitution created a committee o f thirteen men to work in concert with other 
committees to protest the Stamp Act and “or other thing that shall be thought by us 
unconstitutional and oppressive.”25 O f the 94 known signers o f the 1766 constitution, only 
one became a Commissioner for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies (Jeremiah Van 
Rensselaer). Alice Kenney, a historian o f Dutch New York, claims that there was a separate 
Dutch tradition o f protest manifested during the Stamp Act riots and the pro-American 
protestations o f  British policies.26 How the specifically Dutch elements complicated and
21 Smith, A Tour o f  the Hudson, 82-83.
22 Smith, A Tour o f  the Hudson, 83.
23 Smith, A Tour o f  the Hudson, 83-84.
24 Kenney, Stubborn fo r  Liberty, 139. Kenney estimates that there were about 17, 500 people 
in Albany County and less than 100,000 in all o f New York in the late 1750s.
25 The Constitution o f  the Sons o f  Liberty o f  Albany accessed at 
http://www.nvsm.nvsed.gOv/albanv/solconst.html#document.
26 Kenney, Stubborn fo r  Liberty, see revolt chapter.
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informed the scene in Revolutionary Albany is unknown, but it seems that commerce and 
wealth played into political behavior as much, if  not more, than ethnic identity.
Because o f the lack o f research on Albany in the first half o f the eighteenth century 
historians o f the Revolution in New York have often treated Albany as inconsequential in 
comparison to the activities in New York City. The prevalence o f the Dutch language, 
architecture, and insular attitudes are often noted as the entirety o f Albany social sphere. It is 
often thought that the Native American alliances were more important to the commercial 
business o f  the town, and that men in the Dutch Reform Church frequently constituted the 
tow n’s government.27 Other literature ignores the town itself and poses the war in Albany 
County as an extension o f the DeLancey and Livingston land feud. Neither o f these 
approaches gets at the nature o f  Albany as a community before the war. The Minutes fo r  the 
Commission fo r  Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies afford a look at how a community was 
shaped during the war, even if  we lack a complete picture o f how it operated before the war.
Albany, as a unique site o f study during the war, offers the M inutes fo r  the 
Commission fo r  Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies as well as a diverse and complicated 
social history. In the 1930s, Ruth L. Higgins argued that Albany ceased to be a frontierland in 
1690, when settlements to the west were created.28 To be sure, Albany was not by the time of 
the revolution, an isolated outpost, but its concerns— Native American raids and borderland 
skirmishes— were frontier issues. This was especially the case during the years 1778-1780, 
when the Butler and Sullivan raids in the Susquehanna River Valley, including the Cherry 
Valley massacre, disrupted the local economy, contributing to food shortages, migrations, and 
terror, that severely strained the Albany government. 29 Part o f the absence o f secondary
27 Patricia U. Bonomi. A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York. 
(Columbia; 1971) and Robert M. Ketchum. D ivided Loyalties: How the American Revolution 
Came to New York. (New York, 2002).
28 Higgins, Expansion in New York, see appendix map (np).
29 Cherry Valley is only 60 miles west o f Albany. For a concise explanation o f the Cherry 
Valley massacre and the warfare in the Susquehanna Valley see Peter C. Mancall, Valley o f  
Opportunity: Economic Culture along the Susquehanna, 1700-1800. (Ithaca, NY: 1991), 130- 
160, esp. 136-137.
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literature on Albany during the early to mid-eighteenth century can be attributed to the lack o f 
interest in a town caught between the frontier and the metropole, that said the cultural 
diversity o f  the community raises the question o f how ethnic identity structured the reaction to 
violence in the war years. The cultural baggage o f the people who were within and without 
the British Empire, as well as colonials and immigrants, made for a multivalent political scene 
in which revolutionary disorder exerted profound influence on the people who compromised 
Albany.
The Committee System in Albany
In the early years o f rebellion, Albany strictly defined the American cause as redress 
for the Coercive Acts, in a manner that respected the Anglo-American conception o f the 
British constitution. Between 1774 and 1776, a patriot committee system developed across the 
continent and in Albany. Although it is not the intention o f this paper to examine the workings 
o f the Albany Committee o f Correspondence, a b rief look at the evolution o f the agenda and 
the powers o f this Committee is necessary to understand the context in which the Commission 
for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies emerged.
By the early 1770s Albany was governed by a committee called the Corporation, and 
where its powers failed, the Sons o f Liberty took over. But it was not until the First 
Continental Congress that the Committee System became more regulated, and integrated into 
a larger political-governing machine. The call for the First Continental Congress was heeded 
by Albany, which allowed some o f New York C ity’s representatives to act as Albany 
representatives. The First Continental Congress convened between September 5, and October 
10, 1774, to discuss the acts commonly referred to as the Coercive, or Intolerable, Acts.30 This 
Congress had elected representatives from all o f the colonies except Georgia. From the outset
30 The Intolerable Acts include the Boston Port Act, the Massachusetts Government Act, the 
Quebec Act, the Administration o f Justice act, and the Quartering Act passed in May and June 
1774.
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the Congress re-affirmed its allegiance to the Crown and stressed its commitment to
upholding its rights under the British constitution. But its goal was “to obtain redress o f these
grievances, which threaten destruction on the lives, liberty, and property o f his M ajesty’s
subjects in North America.”31 To impress the serious nature o f the Congresses’ grievances
upon the Crown, the Congress voted to boycott imports and products from the British Empire
until the Intolerable Acts were repealed.32
The Congress declared that homemade goods and colonial industry should be
supported and even traditional dress should be modified to accommodate homemade clothing
articles.33 To enforce the boycott and prescriptive dress in the public sphere the Congress
ordered that any merchant caught violating the Congress’s injunction should be punished by a*
local committee.34 These committees were to
be chosen in every county, city, and town, by those who are qualified to 
vote for Representatives in the Legislature, whose business it shall be 
attentively to observe the conduct o f all persons touching this association; 
and when it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction o f a majority o f any 
such committee, that any person within the limits o f their appointment has 
violated this association, that such majority do forthwith cause the truth o f 
the case to be published in the Gazette, to the end that all such foes to the 
rights o f  British America may be publicly know, and universally 
con[d]emned as the enemies o f American liberty; and thenceforth we 
respectively break o ff all dealing with him or her.35
British importers were to be publicly denounced as “enemies o f American liberty” and the 
enforcing bodies were called the Committees o f  Observation and Inspection. A development 
that cannot be stressed enough at this point is the New York General Assem bly’s refusal to
31 “Extracts from the votes and proceedings o f the American Continental Congress, held at 
Philadelphia on the 5th o f  September 1774. Containing the bill o f rights, a list o f grievances, 
occasional resolves, the Association, an address to the people o f Great-Britain, and a 
memorial to the inhabitants o f the British American colonies. Published by order o f the 
Congress.” Philadelphia: printed. Boston: re-printed by Edes and Gill, in Queen Street, and T. 
and J. Fleet, in Comhill., M,DCC,LXXIV. 1774. Evans No. 42728, 13.
32 “Extracts from the votes and proceedings o f the American Continental C ongress...” , 13-15.
33 “Extracts from the votes and proceedings o f the American Continental C ongress...” , 16.
34 “Extracts from the votes and proceedings o f the American Continental C ongress...”, 16. 
The wording also requires the merchandise to be confiscated and either stored at the 
m erchant’s expense, or the profits from the sale o f the boycotted items be distributed to 
Boston, who was suffering the effects o f the occupation and Blockade.
35 “Extracts from the votes and proceedings o f the American Continental C ongress...” , 16-17.
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vote in favor o f a continental association to boycott English goods. The rift between the 
General Assembly and the factions that supported the Continental Association and boycott 
took a full year to mature. From 1774 until April 1775 the Assembly was able to continue to 
function but it was competing against a newly emerging pro-American shadow government.36
Early in April 1775, the General Assembly disbanded and by the end o f the month 
New York City issued a call for a Provincial Congress to form. The first Provincial Congress 
o f New York met on May 22, 1775 and reaffirmed its commitment to making peace with 
England.37 When the Provincial Congress adjourned it appointed a Committee o f Safety to 
undertake specific tasks regarding the implementation o f the Congresses’ resolves. The 
Committee o f  Safety was also to correspond with other state committees and to secure funds, 
and requisitions for the Continental Army.38 The Committee o f Safety was intended to 
operate only when the New York Provincial Congress was not in session. It had a limited 
agenda to pursue in between provincial conventions. Yet this committee was replicated across 
the state, and soon divergent powers would be found in each configuration.
Albany had formed a Committee o f Correspondence in 1774 to handle issues related 
to the protestations o f the English policies and also to curb the activities o f the Sons o f Liberty
36 Agnes Hunt. The Provincial Committees o f  Safety o f  the American Revolution. (New York, 
1968), 62. The General Assembly adjourned in April 1775 and was unable to reconvene. By 
1775, the usurpation o f royal colonial government by committees was becoming more 
effective. A Committee o f Observation and Inspection in Albany, New York, probably did 
exist. Thomas S. Wermuth, in Rip Van W inkle’s Neighbors: The Transformation o f  Rural 
Society in the Hudson River Valley, 1720-1850, relates a vignette about a Committee of 
Safety and Observation in 1775 leading a mob to destroy English tea.36 Unfortunately, one 
problematic o f the remaining records is the inconsistent naming practices o f the revolutionary 
committees. The use o f Committee o f Inspection, Observation, and Safety, or Committee of 
Safety, or Committee o f Inspection and Safety, may actually reveal individual bodies created 
to execute specific Patriot legislation. The names o f the bodies and their prerogatives and 
jurisdictions often overlapped, superseded each other, or worked in concert together. In some 
situations it seems that the committees were organically named based on the needs o f the local 
communities, in other cases it seems that Patriots combined their commissions due to lack of 
manpower or authority. A direct correlation between the Committee o f Inspection and 
Observation called for by the Continental Congress and the active bodies in Albany can be 
assumed but not completely substantiated.
37 Journals o f  the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee o f  Safety and  
Council o f  Safety o f  the State ofNew-York: 1775-1777. (New York; 1842). Hunt, Provincial 
Committees o f  Safety, 63.
38 Hunt, Provincial Committees o f  Safety, 64.
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and the Mechanics Committee.39 From extant material it is known that A lbany’s Committee 
o f Correspondence was meeting in some form by April 1774, because it agreed to allow 
James Duane, John Jay, Philip Livingston, Isaac Low, and John Alsop to represent Albany in 
the First Continental Congress.40 The first recorded meeting minutes from this body was 
January 24, 1775, and was recorded under the name “Committees o f Correspondence and 
Safety.”41
The first meeting o f this Committee stated that it was “to approve o f the Resolves of 
the former Committee o f Correspondence (to wit) their Resolves which have been printed of 
the 23rd o f November and 10th December 1774.”42 The next meetings included nominations to 
cabinet positions as well as electing delegates to the Second Continental Congress and the 
New York Provincial Congress. In addition, these Committee members sent letters to all 
known existing committees o f correspondence and safety in Albany County, asking for
i
attendance at a County meeting regarding organization and discussion about delegate 
selections. At the same time, it ordered “two hundred copies” o f an advertisement for 
donations for Boston, and for the ads “to be stuck up at the most publick Places in said 
Districts” across the county.43
Although the intention o f the Committee was to work through representative bodies 
and consensus, it was immediately drawn into an impending military crisis where it would 
have to define the limits o f its authority as a body. At some point between March 21 and April
39 David G. Hackett discusses the Albany Sons o f Liberty and their power in The Rude Hand  
o f  Innovation: Religion and Social Order in Albany, New York, 1652-1836 (New York 1991), 
50-52.
40 These are the same men that New York City chose. This is James Sullivan’s point in 
Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 1775-1778. (Albany, 1923), iv- 
v. Stefan Bielinksi, the foremost historian on colonial Albany and Director o f the Colonial 
Albany Social History Project, supports the hypothesis that this committee was active in 1774 
in his b rief essay “The Committee o f Correspondence” at 
http://www.nvsm.nvsed.gov/albany/coc.html.
41 Sullivan, ed. M inutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, x.
42 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 5. These 
resolves would have been printed in The Albany Gazette, no known copies o f this paper have 
survived the war era.
43 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 10.
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12, 1775 the Albany Committee o f Correspondence received a letter from the Stockbridge,
M assachusetts, Committee o f Correspondence. It can be extrapolated that the Stockbridge
committee inquired about the pro-British population o f Kinderhook, New York (only about 25
miles separated the two towns). The Albany Committee found it necessary to respond with
“reluctance” that it was true that Kinderhook refused to support the Continental Association
and that Albany was
still willing to hope that their Conduct rather proceeded from wrong 
Representations and apprehensions, Propagated and instilled by those (as 
you justly suggest) who are disaffected to the Rights and Liberties of 
America, than to an unfriendly disposition to the Common Cause, a Cause 
o f Greater Consequence, than they now are aware of...44
Two weeks later, Albany again wrote to Stockbridge— “we are extremely sorry to
find that the Kings Troops have commenced Hostilities against your Province”—  but
since it, as a Committee o f Correspondence, was a “ Sub-Committee” o f a larger
body, it could not send military assistance. But it could assure Stockbridge that “your
fears o f the Inhabitants o f Kinderhook taking up arms against you, we look upon as
entirely Groundless.”45
In this instance, the Committee was formed to create open communication with other
committees and based its legitimacy on the directives o f the Continental Congress and the
New York Provincial Congress. This exchange reveals that it saw itself subordinate to a larger
enterprise but was immediately cognizant o f  the reality o f conflicting loyalties and violence.
By April 29, 1775, the violence in Massachusetts necessitated new protections “for the Safety
o f the good People o f this County And whereas the Committee o f Correspondence do not
conceive themselves fully invested with the Power to do every matter which in this Critical
Hour may become necessary.. .”46 The Minutes continue to explain that either the current
Committee should be transformed or a new one created “to be a Committee o f Safetyf,]
44 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 12. As the war 
played out Kinderhook continued to be a hotbed o f Loyalism and afforded the Albany 
Committees plenty o f suspects for disaffection.
45 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 13.
46 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 15.
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Protection and Correspondence, with Full Powers to Transact all such matters as they shall 
conceive may tend to the welfare o f the American C ause...”47
On May 1,1775, all citizens who were eligible to vote were called to a meeting to 
decide if they would fully support joining “the Several Colonies on the Continent, in their 
opposition to the Ministerial Plan now prosecuting against us.”48 The attendees agreed and the 
Committee, with expanded powers, should begin to gather resources to support the 
rebellion.49
The Committee, meeting almost daily, engaged in heated correspondence with local 
New York counties as well as South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania Committees 
regarding their respective stances on military action, both locally and across the colonies. 
Throughout the summer o f 1775 the Committee o f  Safety, Protection, and Correspondence 
was occupied with quelling rumors o f Indian and slave rebellions, as well as collecting war 
materiel and raising a militia.50 This committee began negotiating with Oneida,
Canandaiguas, Mohawks, and other Native American tribes in the Six Nations, sometimes at 
the behest o f the Indians and more often, to counteract British machinations with their Indian 
allies. Much o f the unrest had to do with Colonel Guy Johnson, the English Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, and Joseph Brant, a powerful Mohawk leader, who rallied Native Americans 
to uphold their alliances with the English. The Committee also received correspondence and
47 Sullivan, ed. M inutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 15.
48 Sullivan, ed. M inutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 16-17.
49 Their first action on May 1, 1775 was to write a letter o f support to Boston in which Albany 
declared “On the twenty second Instant a Provincial Congress will meet when we have not the 
least doubt but such effectual Aids will be afforded you, as will Teach Tyrants and their 
Minions that as we were bom free, we will live and die so, and transmit the inestimable 
Blessing to Posterity, be assured Gentleman that nothing on our Parts shall be wanting to 
evince that we are deeply impressed with a Sense o f Unanimity, and that we mean to Co- 
opperate [sic] with you in this arduous struggle for Liberty to the Utmost o f our Pow er...” 
Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 18.
50 As o f May 4, 1775 the Albany Corporation, the representative government o f the city was 
still functioning and asked this Committee to help it create a Night Watch. By this time, the 
Corporation’s legitimacy and ability to effect change had eroded. Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the 
Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 25.
15
reports from Northern New York about General Guy Carleton’s military preparations in 
Canada.
It was not until the first week o f July that the Com m ittee’s authority began to stretch 
beyond the physical safety o f the county’s inhabitants when it had to decide if a person held 
opinions inimical to the American cause. At this point, the American cause was clearly 
defined as protesting the “Deluded and Despotic Ministry” to restore “Harmony and Peace, 
upon Constitutional Principles.”51 Peter Van Ness was the first person suspected o f not 
supporting the American cause, and was interrogated by the Committee. They found that he 
“bears a good Character and that o f a Friend to the Cause of Liberty.” The Committee also 
warned Van Ness not to press counter-charges against his accusers in order to facilitate the 
“Reconciliation o f Peace in the Neighborhood, and the Promotion o f the General Cause o f 
Liberty.”52 From this point forward, people accused o f supporting the Crown, or people 
accused o f  being neutral, were periodically brought before the board by their own neighbors 
and acquaintances.
In August 1775, surveillance o f strangers and people o f questionable political 
affiliation began in earnest. On August 5, the Committee wrote to the surrounding counties 
that pro-British suppliers and officials were passing through their district with information 
regarding Patriot activities. In order to stop this behavior Albany recommended that all 
passages to the northwest be guarded. In addition these counties should “prevent all Strangers, 
and also all known Persons o f whose Sentiments they are Scrupulous in respect to the United 
Cause from Passing up the Mohawk River farther than the German Flatts without a Pass or 
Recommendation from the Congress or some known Committee.”53 The Albany Committee
51 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 128. That 
summer war preparations were considered a precaution as the primary mode o f reconciliation 
was hoped to be diplomatic negotiations.
52 July 4, 1775. Sullivan, ed. M inutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 
147.
53 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 187. German 
Faltts is about 80 miles northwest o f Albany.
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also sent “a Copy o f  this Resolve... to the Congress to obtain their Sentiments.”54 Governance 
by committee-system was a dialogic enterprise, where sometimes the directives came from 
the Congress and other times the local needs o f the pro-American committees, pressed 
uniform action upon other committees via the Congress. The power to impress the need for 
specific types o f legislation upon the Congress, testifies to the legitimacy that that 
representative body had gained in a short time. The respect with which it was held, as duly 
elected and representative o f the majority o f the voting people’s wishes, was growing.
As the tempo o f war preparations accelerated on both sides, so did the restrictions on 
civic life in Albany. By late summer 1775, the Committee was regulating behavior in terms of 
militia duty and night watch guard duty. Failure to attend either resulted in fines, and 
interrogation, while raising a false alarm also resulted in fines.55 September found two men 
jailed by the Committee for “inimical conduct against the American Cause.”56 In November 
the Committee was presented with the problem o f  counterfeiting and depreciating money.57 
Increasingly, other committees and Albany’s inhabitants were looking to the Committee of 
Safety, Protection, and Correspondence to ensure a consistent level o f security in their 
everyday lives.
The Turning Point: 1776-1778
For over a year, the Albany Committee of Safety, Protection, and Correspondence 
extended its authority from an enforcer o f the Provincial and Continental Congresses’ 
directives to a de facto governing body in the city and county o f Albany. But by January 1776 
the Committee reached a breaking point in dealing with “certain'Persons avowedly inimical to 
the Rights & Liberties o f America, [who] are making use o f undue influence and propagating
54 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 187.
55 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 241.
56 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 244.
57 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 291.
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Sentiments with the express view to deter the virtuous asserters o f  American Freedom.”58 
During 1775, people were either brought before the Board to be questioned or a sub­
committee was appointed to investigate each individual claim. As the claims mounted, the 
Committee realized that a more permanent body needed to be established to investigate 
alleged cases o f inimical behavior, disaffection to the American cause, slanderous speech 
directed against the committee, and flat-out spying for the British.
Between January 1776 and May 1776, the Albany Committee o f Correspondence 
became frustrated with the number o f complaints that they had to deal with and began 
charging sureties and bonds for all people found guilty o f speaking ill o f the board, or the 
American cause.59 Increasingly financial punishment for loyalty to the Crown was not enough 
to deter supporters, so the Committee implemented restrictions on movements.60 But policing 
the behavior o f the populace took away from the Committee o f Correspondence’s daily 
administrative duties o f  governing the town and county during a war.61 Increasingly Albany 
tried to send people o f suspect loyalties to the towns from which they originated or passed 
them on to military tribunals. In most cases, these people were sent back to Albany wasting 
time, money, and resources arguing over whose jurisdiction these people fell under.
In response to the complaints from Albany and other committees, the Provincial 
Congress formed the First Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in May 
1776 to “make effectual provision for detecting, restraining and punishing disaffected and 
dangerous persons in that colony.”62 This commission was meant to focus on Tory plots that 
threatened a united colonial response to the royal government. However, this council was too 
small and inefficient, so in June a new committee was formed. Shortly thereafter the
58 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 306.
59 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 388.
60 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 392.
61 While the Com m ittee’s frustrations mounted the community turned to the Committee to 
handle allegations o f inflation, election fraud, petty theft, smuggling, and militia desertion. 
Basically, local governance had effectively fallen to the Committee by spring 1776.
62 Alexander C. Flick, The American Revolution in New York: Its Political, Social and  
Economic Significance. (Albany; 1926), 44.
18
Provincial Congress suspended the commission’s duties and took over hearing cases against 
Loyalists.
The Declaration o f Independence altered the political scene in Albany. One o f the 
least surprising changes that occurred was that the definitions o f loyalty and political 
affiliation became more finite after July 1776. Word o f the Declaration reached Albany by the 
18th and the Committee o f Correspondence declared that it would be posted outside City hall 
at 11 am on July 19th. It was read to the militiamen and townsfolk who had gathered to hear 
it; it was “received with applause and satisfaction.”63 One historian argued that each 
“American was forced to take a stand. Either he must acknowledge him self a Loyalist and 
hence a champion o f oppression and tyranny and a traitor to the United States” or he was a 
friend to the American cause.64 There would be no room for Loyalism or neutrality in Albany 
after mid-July.
In September o f 1776, the Provincial Congress organized a new conspiracy 
committee with seven members. This committee was given power to create and direct county 
committees for detecting conspiracies.65 The committee formed in September only sat until 
January, when it was again dissolved. The creation and dissolution o f specialty committees 
corresponded with the limited authority the Provincial Congress was granted by its 
representatives. If  the Provincial Congress was only authorized to convene for a specific 
amount o f time, the bodies that were subordinate to it were also only legitimate when they 
could directly derive their authority from the Congress.
The cycle o f creation and dissolution continued throughout 1777, until about the time 
New York ratified its state constitution. For example a new state commission for detecting 
conspiracies was formed during February 1777, with just three members, and by August 1777 
it had grown to a nine-member body named “Commissioners for Detecting and Defeating all
63 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 497.
64 Flick, The American Revolution in New York, 71.
65 Victor Hugo Paltsits, ed. Minutes o f  the Commissioners fo r  Detecting and Defeating  
Conspiracies in the State o f  New York: 1778-1781. (Albany: NY State Press, 1909), 11.
19
Conspiracies.”66 At this point it seems that the directives from the Provincial Congress 
resulted in local committees o f correspondence forming their own Commissions for Detecting 
and Defeating Conspiracies. For example, the town o f Fish Kill had its own “conspiracy 
commission” that Albany sent its suspected Tories to when it did not have its own 
commission convened.67 These local bodies derived their power from the local governing 
committees but also from the legitimate Provincial Congress. It seems that the way that the 
Committee o f  Safety operated was the model for how the committees for detecting and 
defeating conspiracies functioned, especially in terms o f its structure and the scope o f its 
activities which were tied to a limited agenda and subordinate to the Provincial Congress.68
Between April 1777, when the New York State Constitution was ratified, and April
1778, when the notes for the commission begin, the type o f organization and powers this
committee was granted continued to evolve. Although legislation was introduced in October
1777 to create a permanent committee for detecting conspiracies the bill was tabled. It was
not until February 1778 that a comprehensive bill was passed. An Act appointing the
Commissioners fo r  detecting and defeating Conspiracies, and declaring their powers passed
in the state convention. The preamble states:
by Reason o f the present Invasion o f this State, and o f the 
Disaffection o f sundry o f the Inhabitants o f the same, it 
will be expedient to continue the said Board; which 
experience hath shewn to be o f great Use and Importance.
To the End therefore, that the State and the Peace o f the 
same, may be effectually guarded and secured, against the 
wicked M achinations and Designs o f the Foreign and 
Domestic Foes thereof.69 
The previous commissions were perceived as having been effective in their goals and the state
assembly continued to refine and alter the body’s authority. In April 1778, when the notes for
66 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 11.
67 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 587.
68 It does not seem that Albany had its own committee for detecting and defeating 
conspiracies until October 1776 but the functioning and duration o f this committee is 
unknown; it may be probable that it operated in similar fashion to the state committee; but 
only a few references to an operating committee exist in the Minutes o f  the Albany County 
Committee o f  Correspondence.
69 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, Appendix I, 111.
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the commission begin, two more acts were passed respecting “disaffected persons.”70 One 
gave permission to the board to remove any “dangerous disaffected Persons and Families, as 
now are, or hereafter shall happen to be resident at or near any Post, Pass or Encampment, 
within this State, to be removed to such other Place or Places within the same, as he shall 
deem expedient.”71 The other increased the number o f commissioners to be appointed.72 
These acts provide a clear idea o f what type o f  agenda the Commissioners were trying to 
pursue and how they were achieving those measures.
The commission was empowered to send for people and evidence, confine people, 
and to take bonds from people released on recognizance. The commissioners also were 
responsible for the comfort o f confined individuals, and not to inflict “corporal punishment” 
on prisoners. In addition, they were to keep regular minutes, which were to be submitted to 
the New York state legislature for review.73 The amended bill, passed on April 3, 1778, 
allowed the number o f commissioners to be no greater than “twenty or thirty,” but only a 
quorum o f  three were needed at any time or place to legally convene a hearing.74
70 Paltsits, ed. M inutes, Appendix I, 780.
71 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, Appendix I, 780.
72 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 782.
73 Flick, American Revolution in New York, 344.
74 Paltsits, ed. Mintues, 16. It is unable to be ascertained from the existing sources when the 
Albany Committee o f Correspondence received instructions to create a commission for 
detecting and defeating conspiracies. The act passed on February 5, 1778 but no notation for
the receipt o f a letter o f instruction either from the Congress, the governor, or another
committee is listed. Between February 5 and April 3, 1778, when the amended act passed, the 
Albany Committee o f Correspondence received two letters from private individuals, six from 
other committees, nine from American military officers, one from an English military officer, 
one from their assembly representatives, and three from the governor. {Minutes o f  the Albany 
County Committee o f  Correspondence, 920-959. This survey does not count letters brought to 
the board and orally defended, only letters brought by post or messenger.) The letter from the 
assembly representatives is dated February 15 and was received on February 18th. It contained 
the “Resolutions o f Congress and Resolutions o f a Convention o f the different States” but 
apparently only pertaining to the regulation o f wheat and food prices. {Minutes o f  the Albany 
County Committee o f  Correspondence, 926) From this letter and the letters from the governor 
to this committee, the average message took between one and five days to arrive. Why the act 
for a commission for detecting and defeating conspiracies is not mentioned is not known, 
although it does reveal some limitations o f the source in terms o f assessing how and why 
certain entries were made in the primary source and what was not being written in the records 
and why.
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Between February and April 1778, the Committee o f Correspondence continued to 
handle cases that involved suspected Tories, admitted Loyalists, and those who refused to take 
oaths o f allegiance to the new state.75 Oddly enough, a spate o f local committee formation 
occurred in early April when committees were formed to examine inn- and tavern-keepers 
(for proper liquor licenses), to examine “depradations” (damages inflicted on private property 
by soldiers), and to act as a special treasury emissary, but no mention o f a conspiracy 
commission.76 Around the same time the Committee of Correspondence recommended “to the 
Committees o f the respective Districts in this County fortwith [sic] to disarm all such 
Inhabitants o f their Districts who have been with the Enemy, and not taken the Oath o f 
Allegiance to this State, or other ways evinced their Sincerity to the Cause o f America.” In 
addition, the Albany Committee o f Correspondence also asked them to “apprehend and send 
to this City all such Prisoners o f War, Deserters from the Enemy, and Inhabitants o f this 
County who have been with the Enemy and still evince their Enmity to the Cause of 
America.”77 It is unknown if the board planned to examine these people or if the Commission 
for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies was expected to convene and handle these cases.
The first meeting o f the Albany County Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies was held on April 13, 1778. Seven o f  the fourteen members o f the Commission 
were active members o f the Committee o f Correspondence for the month preceding the 
com m ission’s formation— four o f whom constituted the core o f the commission almost 
continuously through 1781. For the remaining crossover days it seems that three core 
members Isaac D.Fonda, John M. Beeckman, and Jeremiah Van Rensselear, were attending 
both committees. M atthew Visscher served as secretary for both committees. The notes for 
the Committee o f Correspondence effectively end on April 16, 1778 with an additional
75 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence. See February 
25, 932; March 4, 935; March 9, 940; March 18,945; March 26, 950 and April 1, 956.
76 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence. April 2and 4, 
957-959.
77Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 956.
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meeting in June to appoint a committee to audit the accounts.78 It is unknown whether these 
men continued to work on both committees. Unfortunately, more information pertaining to 
the Committee o f Correspondence was destroyed in the fire at the Capitol Building in Albany 
in March 1911.79
For the purpose o f this study, the Commission will be treated as a single entity 
because no dissenting voice was ever recorded in these minutes between April 1778 and 
August 1781. All decisions were rendered as unanimous and singular. As much as these 
Minutes shed light onto the types o f behavior occurring in small communities during the 
Revolution, they also obscure the individual personalities who in fact created the 
Revolutionary era community and state. It is important to keep in mind that in general the 
committees were mostly composed o f the elites o f the community; some were traditional 
landowners, merchants, and politicians trying to keep their local power consolidated and some 
were political upstarts, but with enough wealth to be taken seriously by the older elites. There 
were thirteen men appointed to the Albany County Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies between 1778 and 1781; fifty-one total for all counties in New York. In 
Albany’s case, from a cursory survey o f the names that appear in the Committee of 
Correspondence, Provincial Congress, and the Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
conspiracies, these men had been pro-American from 1775 onward.
Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies
April 20, 1777 brought the ratification o f the first constitution o f the state o f New 
York. The constitution explicitly states how the committee system was conceived to operate 
and how it derived its legitimacy from the people. The New York state legislators felt that the 
committee system had been a temporary expedient to the abuses o f the Crown. They wrote,
78 Sullivan, ed. Minutes o f  the Albany County Committee o f  Correspondence, 962-963.
79 It can be pieced together, from letters and references in existing sources, that the Committee 
continued operating into the 1780s.
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“whereas the present government o f this colony, by congress and committees, was instituted
while the former government, under the Crown o f Great Britain, existed in full force, and was
established for the sole purpose o f opposing the usurpation o f the British Parliament.” 80 The
constitution argues that the committee system was to become obsolete when the reconciliation
with Britain occurred but that that outcome “is now considered as remote and uncertain.”81
The legislators also complained that “many and great inconveniences attend the said
mode o f government by congress and committees, as o f necessity, in many instances,
legislative, judicial, and executive popovers have been vested therein.”82 While they make it
quite clear that Britain was at fault for necessitating an organic governing system they
believed now that imperial rule was an outlandish prospect. The constitution states that it
appears absolutely irreconcilable to reason and good conscience for the 
people o f these colonies now to take the oaths and affirmations necessary 
for the support o f any government under the Crown o f  Great Britain, and it 
is necessary that the exercise o f every kind o f authority under the said 
Crown should be totally suppressed, and all the popovers o f  government 
exerted under the authority o f the people o f the colonies for the preservation 
o f internal peace, virtue, and good order, as well as for the defense o f our 
lives, liberties, and properties, against the hostile invasions and cruel 
depredations o f our enem ies.. .83
Britain was no longer capable o f exercising legitimate power over New York and
since the mechanism for government was in place it now was to be considered the
only legitimate governing body in the state. The constitution
recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions o f the United 
colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies o f their affairs 
has been hitherto established, to adopt such government as shall, in the 
opinion o f the representatives o f the people, best conduce to the happiness 
and safety o f their constituents in particular, and America in general.84
80 New York State Constitution o f  1777 accessed at The Avalon Project at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 8th century/nvO 1 .asp.
81 New York State Constitution o f  1777 accessed at The Avalon Project at 
http://avalon.law.vale.eduy 18th century/nyOl .asp.
82 New York State Constitution o f  1777 accessed at The Avalon Project at 
http.7/avalon.law.vale.edu/18th centurv/nvOl .asp.
83 New York State Constitution o f  1777 accessed at The Avalon Project at 
http://avalon.law.vale.edu/18th century/nyOl .asp.
84 New York State Constitution o f  1777 accessed at The Avalon Project at 
http://avalon.law.vale.edu/18th centurv/nvOl .asp.
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One can envision the committee system as a top-down network o f  assemblies, each 
receiving and implementing orders as they were passed down the line. This would be a 
simplistic view o f how the committee system actually worked. It was a collaborative and 
dialogic process in which the individual communities relayed the pressures and realities o f 
their experiences horizontally to local communities and vertically to the county and then state 
levels. When the congress created laws that addressed issues specific to one community, they 
were adopted as needed among other communities. Importantly, the individual communities 
were not afforded different levels o f autonomy emanating outward from the highest 
committee (New York Congress) but instead the congress had to derive its legitimacy and 
authority from the multitude o f committees and local governments below it. Although, 
directives from the state committees often tried to coordinate American policies, only 
voluntary, local implementation made the state government effective.
The Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies played a major role in 
garnering popular support for the Albany committee system. By instituting oaths of 
allegiance, imposing financial penalties, and restricting movements, the commission built a 
community that legitimized the Patriot government. The Commission for Detecting and 
Defeating Conspiracies targeted known Loyalists and people suspected to be disaffected to 
the American cause. In the post-1777 context disaffection was simply any behavior that 
demonstrated that the individual did not believe in the legitimacy o f the American 
government. In this time period disaffection was a real, discrete political category that defined 
the lack o f  loyalty to the government.
On the surface this committee’s behavior could provide an opportunity to delineate 
the shades o f neutrality and the categories o f political allegiance in the revolutionary period, 
but it does not. From this source one cannot correlate the degree o f political affiliation with 
the punishment or restrictions assigned to the alleged offender. There are too many external 
factors that may have affected how punishments were determined such as previous political 
behavior, personal relationships within the community, the personalities on the commission,
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military exigencies, Verm ont’s secession, or the financial status o f  the state treasury. All o f 
these external factors, and more, limit the ways in which the information in this source can be 
handled. Due to this the implications o f this committee’s behavior can only be painted in 
broad strokes.85
What remains is that it was due to committees like the Commission for Detecting 
and Defeating Conspiracies that a coherent political agenda could be implemented in New 
York. After the Declaration o f Independence and the ratification o f the state constitution, New 
York could dedicate itself fully to creating a new state. Determining the political affiliation of 
the inhabitants o f the community was the first step to building a new sovereign body. The 
mission o f the Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies was finding disaffection 
in all o f its forms and limiting the potential power disaffected persons could wield.
Oaths of Allegiance
The oath o f allegiance is a much-debated topic today as it was during this country’s 
inception. In the 1950s, Harold Hyman maintained that loyalty oaths were the most 
oppressive forms o f power in the Revolution. Hyman posited that American oaths o f 
allegiance “emulat[ed] royal and rebel practices at hom e...[and] used loyalty tests as weapons 
o f ideology, political partisanship, and peculation.”861 argue for a commonly found theme in 
the historiography o f  loyalty oaths, that oaths “place Americans in increasingly extreme 
positions regarding allegiance” and that the Commission for Detecting and Defeating 
Conspiracies enabled these political extremes to be implemented.87
85 One o f the broad strokes is the trend towards correlating disaffection with overt Loyalism 
from the spring o f 1779 onwards.
86 Harold M. Hyman, To Try M en's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History. (Berkeley, 
1959), 23. In a very pessimistic view o f the American revolution, he also poses American 
commissions as illegitimate bodies that tyrannized innocent members o f the British empire.
87 Hyman, To Try M e n ’s Souls, 61.
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There are many complicated themes intertwined with loyalty oaths such as ethnic
identity, religious affiliation, political citizenship, and personal inclination. But what the
Commission hoped to do was to create a set o f normative values for the community as a
whole and then forcefully socialize the individual into those norms through the use o f the
oath. The oath was a public declaration in front o f the committee, representative o f the
legitimate government, and was often witnessed by a personal acquaintance o f the oath-giver
and reinforced by a financial commitment (surety or bond) paid by a second party. The
Commission made sure that individuals were made responsible not just to the new American
government but also to the community in which they lived.
The oaths o f allegiance were mainly uniform in content; most relied on the oath-
taker’s sanity, and god, to solidify the contractual nature o f this speech. In June 1778, the state
assembly passed an act that explains how the oath should be taken.
I, A.B. do solemnly, and without any mental Reservation or Equivocation 
whatever, swear and call God to Witness; or if o f  the People called Quakers, 
affirm, that I do believe and acknowledge, the State o f New- York, to be of 
Right, a Free and Independent State. And that no Authority or Power, can of 
Right, be exercised in or over the said State, but what is, or shall be granted 
by or derived from the People thereof. Andfurther, that as a good Subject o f 
the said Free and Independent State o f New York, I will to the best o f my 
Knowledge and Ability, faithfully do my Duty; and as I shall keep or 
disregard this Oath. So help and deal with me Almighty God.88
Five young men tendered an oath o f Allegiance to the state on July 11, 1781 in which they 
stated,
I do swear upon the holy Evangelists o f Almighty god that I will be true to 
the State o f New York and will Conduct m yself as a good and faithful 
subject o f the said State ought to do; that and I will not aid, comfort, council 
with, or Assist in any way whatever any o f the Enemies o f the said State o f 
New York or the United States o f America and that 1 will immediately 
make known any Plots that may be intended against any o f the said United 
States and discover that may come to my knowledge any o f  their Enemies 
whenever I know there are any lurking about in the Country to any Officer 
or to the Board o f Commissioners— So help me God— 89
88 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 784.
89 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 747.
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Quakers, or Shakers, posed the largest hurdle to this type o f  allegiance. Many 
protested it as a violation o f their religious beliefs. To address this problem and to make the 
oath-taking process more inclusive, an act was passed in April 1778 to allow Quakers to 
affirm their allegiance by raising their hands, instead of swearing an oath. The Quakers 
continued to claim that the wording o f the oaths violated their religious beliefs and “petitioned 
the legislature for relief.”90
Oath-taking was very serious to the men o f Revolutionary Albany; an oath was a 
person’s reputation, promise, and contractual obligation. Michael Kammen explored the 
effects o f oath-taking on the community in his essay “The American Revolution as a Crise de 
Conscience: The Case o f New York.” He warns historians against ignoring “a history o f inner 
turmoil which is suffused with tragic power because it is so very personal and deeply felt.”91 
When looking at the Commission’s interactions in terms o f a policy to coordinate authority 
and gain legitimacy, creating a population nominally Patriot was the first step in weeding out 
dissenters. Kammen argues, “maintaining political supremacy was paramount; adherence to 
abstract principles was secondary.”92 Here Kammen brings to the fore the paradoxical nature 
o f each state in America: a Commission that forces people to pledge themselves to a state that 
celebrates freedom from tyranny. Because o f the coercive nature o f these oaths, many o f them 
“concluded with a declaration that they were voluntarily sworn without any mental 
reservation. In many cases such forced hypocrisy only compounded the violation o f 
conscience.”93 Kammen posed oath taking as a crisis o f conscience, and oaths as “expressions 
o f integrity,” and the violation o f personal integrity as the true cost o f the war.94
Conversely, historians like James H. Kettner argue that men like the Commissioners
“were concerned to keep their cause legitimate and to avoid measures that resembled too
90 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 43.
91 Michael Kammen, “The American Revolution as a Crise de Conscience: The Case o f New 
York” Richard M. Jellison, ed. Society, Freedom, and Conscience: The American Revolution 
in Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York. (New York; 1976), 189.
92 Kammen, Crise de Conscience, 130.
93 Kammen, Crise de Conscience, 157.
94 Kammen, Crise de Conscience, 165.
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closely their arbitrary actions o f their former sovereign.”95 The Commission mitigated overt 
oppression by allowing an accused person to think about taking the oath. Oath taking was 
extremely important to the people o f Albany and it forced them to examine the ideological 
and material conditions o f  their lifestyles in order to choose a side.96
The distinctions between these two processes that Kammen and Kettner lay out are 
not that clear. The commission took pains to gamer the support o f the populace and to appear 
legitimate as per the language in the constitution. For example, on July 30, 1778, when a 
neighborhood was split over the character o f a person named Simon Frazer, who was 
allegedly disaffected; dueling petitions were circulated for and against his release from jail.
By the time the matter came to the board the petition against Frazer’s release read that some 
people had “uneasiness” and wanted to “enter into a Combination to lessen the Number o f the 
disaffected by sending the Orders to move o ff & threatening to Abide by the Consequence in 
Case o f Neglect.”97 The Commission debated the issue and decided that, “such Declarations 
are unwarrantable and tend to sap the Foundation o f all Law and good Government.” The 
Commission continued to note, that “this Board will receive into their Custody & Charge all 
such disaffected Persons who upon Proof can be convicted o f any Crimes against the Liberties 
o f A m erica...” and if the inhabitants were to send anyone to the Commission to be tried they 
must “send with them the Charges against them properly attested.”98 The Commission took 
pains to inform the community o f its intentions to give due process to everyone, and that 
expectations for fairness and order would be met to the best o f its abilities.
In addition to making sure a fair process was followed, the commissioners also 
signified which part o f the committee system was legitimate. On August 8, the Commission in
95 James H. Kettner, “The Development o f American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: 
The idea o f Volitional Allegiance.” The American Journal o f  Legal History, v. 18, no. 3 (Jul 
1978), 208-242, 225.
96 An example o f this occurs on July 17,1778. Two men “requested Time to consider of it[the 
oath] till Next M onday morning at ten Oclock which was granted them .” Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 
173.
97 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 185.
98 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 185.
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Albany received disturbing news that a group o f  people was impersonating the conspiracy 
commission and harassing and interrogating alleged disaffected peopled in the “Hosack 
District.” The Commission Minutes note that “sundry Persons under the Pretence o f having 
Authority from the Commissioners o f Conspiracies to examine into the Conduct o f Persons 
by them supposed to have been unfriendly to the American Cause [,] use unbecoming 
Language[,] and pretend to exercise Power not vested in them.”99 These pretenders caused the 
residents o f the area to feel “ ill used.” The Commission “resolved that no Person or Persons 
under any Pretence whatsoever disturb or molest any o f the Inhabitants without first obtaining 
due P ro o f’ and that direct authority must be given by the Albany Commission “or any other 
legal Authority o f the State.” If  the pretenders persisted in their actions the Commission 
threatened that “they shall answer the same at their Peril.” 100 This may be a seemingly bizarre 
case but in a war-torn countryside there were competing structures o f governance. Besides the 
Anglo-American conflict there were American-American conflicts. Different levels o f 
revolution were occurring, some more radical than what the Commission for Detecting and 
Defeating Conspiracies was trying to pursue.
The Commission did not tread softly regularly— it aggressively created a new 
citizenry in Albany County. These tactics inspired resistance, possibly more so than if  they 
had left the inhabitants alone. For example, Archibald McNeal was ordered to appear on May 
16, 1781 ostensibly to be interrogated about his activities. He asked that he be able to stay at 
his farm and the Commissioners agreed if he took the “Oath o f Allegiance to this State.” He 
refused and declared “his Intention o f Not taking up Arms in Defence o f the American 
Cause.” 101 The same day Duncan M cArthur was “questioned as to his Political Principles and 
declaring his Intention o f not taking up Arms in defence o f the Country and acknowledging at
99 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 197.
100 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 197.
101 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 712.
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the same time that he was sworn for the King when Burgoyne came down.” 102 Both were 
ja iled .103
The best-case scenarios for the Commission were people who chose to take the oath 
o f allegiance or people who already took the oath and had proof. For example on July 30,
1778 Dirk Delamater “who was cited to appear this Day” , claimed that he had “heretofore 
taken an Oath o f Allegiance.” 104 He was told to produce the certificate o f proof, which was 
written out and registered by the committee from which the oath was administered. Delamater 
returned to the Albany Commission on August 6 with a “Certificate subscribed by Richard 
Esseltyne Esqr. Justice o f the Peace o f his having taken the Oath o f Allegiance to the 
State.” 105 Delamater’s allegiance was assured and he was released from examination. The 
process was sometimes as simple as Col. Hendrick Frey’s. He “was cited to appear this Day[,] 
appeared and being tendered the Oath prescribed by the Act lately passed by the Legislature[.] 
he declared his W illingness to take and it was accordingly administered to him.” 106
Oftentimes, people requested more time to consider the oath, especially in the early 
years after Independence. Although, choice was the centrifugal force around which this 
committee operated the Patriot governing framework determined how the allegiances could be 
constructed. The Commission also established the timetable on which the decision would be 
made, and decided the consequences o f that decision, while preserving the illusion o f  
voluntary allegiance. Although, if a person requested time to consider the oath and he did not 
report back to the Commission “his Non Attendance should be construed into a Refusal.” 107 
Other people just flatly refused to take the oath. On August 13, 1778 David Van 
Schaack “appeared before the Board in Consequences o f a Notice published in Louden’s
102 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 712.
103 Unfortunately for the Commission their tactics were not one hundred percent effective. 
Archibald McNeal was previously arrested and released on May 28, 1779 to enlist with 
Colonel Henry Van Rensselaer’s new regiment, his time with the Patriots must not have 
changed his mind about allegiances.
104 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 186.
105 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 195.
106 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 197.
107 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 223.
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Paper and being tendered the Oath prescribed by the Act he refused to take” it.108 An example
that illuminates both the personality o f  an individual brought before the board and also what
the board considered particularly offensive or anomalous behavior is recorded on July 23,
1778. The Act pertaining to persons o f  neutral and equivocal behavior had recently been
passed and the Commission had issued citations for a number o f people to come before it and
take the oath. The act states that “certain o f inhabitants o f  this State, have, during the Course
o f the present cruel War, waged by the King and Parliament o f Great-Britain, against the
People o f these States, affected to maintain a Neutrality, which there is reason to suspect was
in many Instances, dictated by a Poverty o f Spirit, and an undue attachment to Property.” 109
After a few more paragraphs o f scathing language about people who “shelter themselves
under a government” that they refuse to help create and sustain, but also “daily endeavor to
undermine and subvert,” the Commission was empowered to call people before who may
have the power to “do m ischief’ to the state governm ent.110 Two o f  the men who were called
before it were Barent Van Der Pool and Andries Huyck. They
appeared before the Board according to the Citations served on them and 
they being tendered the Oath prescribed by the Act lately passed by the 
Legislature absolutely refused to take it—  Benjamin Baker also appeared 
before the Board according to Citation and the Oath by the Act prescribed 
he refused to take it and declared that if he did he would perjure him self and 
none but Rogues and Fools would or could take it.111
Needless to say the Commissioners were not impressed. They resolved
that such a Declaration is a high Contempt and Insult upon the Authority o f 
this State in General and this Board in particular and that therefore in the
108 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 202. Samuel Loudon, a Patriot who escaped occupied New York, 
published The New-York Packet, and the American Advertiser in Fish Kill, New York. See 
Isaiah Thomas, et al. The History o f  Printing in America: With a Biography o f  Printers, and 
an Account o f  Newspapers. (1874)
109 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 783-786. This act also empowered the Commission to exile neutrals 
and loyalists to the enemy lines, publish their names in newspapers, and register their names 
on a state-wide list o f Loyalists. The act also has a communal element in it in so much as all 
property o f people who refused to take the oath, “shall be charged with double
taxes... hereafter.”
110 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 783-786.
111 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 177-178.
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Judgement o f  this Board it is inconsistent with the safety [of] the said State 
that the said Benjamin Baker should be permitted to go at large.112
Baker was imprisoned.
Normally, the first entry for the day was routine. Men such as Van Der Pool and 
Huyck showed up, were interviewed, and often refused to take an oath. Perhaps they had had 
a more mundane conversation with the Commissioners that warranted no special comments 
from the Commission secretary. Perhaps a person like Baker was already disliked by the 
Commissioners and was goaded into such a declaration or possibly, as Kammen suggests, his 
conscience would not allow him to be abused by this rebellious body. Two weeks later 
Benjamin Baker, among others, was given ten days notice to “gather fourteen Days Provision 
for themselves and such o f their Families as they chuse should accompany them (Persons 
capable o f bearing Arms excepted) they are also permitted to take with them all their 
Cloathing and Household Furniture[.] The charges o f  Transportation to the Enemies is to be 
defrayed by themselves.” 113 Although we can only conjecture why Benjamin Baker made 
such a declaration, it is a rare opportunity to hear a voice that otherwise would have been lost.
The wording o f  the Commission’s response in the M inutes is also important because 
the board knew what was at stake if  it did not severely punish detractors. The “Declaration is 
a high Contempt and Insult upon the Authority o f  this State in General and this Board in 
particular.” 114 The Commissioners recognized their roles as branches o f the state government 
and surmised that their inability to coerce allegiance out o f the local inhabitants would de- 
legitimize their mission and result in a loss o f authority. Baker’s challenge to the legitimacy 
o f the Commission (and to the American war for Independence) struck home for the 
Commissioners. Their power was tenuous and limited. Not only were there fears o f
112 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 177-178.
113 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 191. Baker should be considered lucky. The Commission soon would 
not allow exiles to take more than the clothes and food they needed for their journey.
Property, land, assets, and personal items all reverted to the state. The enemy lines the 
Commission refers to is probably Canada. There is further discussion o f sending people under 
a flag o f truce to Canada on August 18, 1778, Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 208-209.
114 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 177-178.
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overwhelming Loyalist support but also if men like Benjamin Baker were allowed to stay in 
the community, he could provoke an outburst o f Tory militarism. More likely if Baker would 
have stayed, he would have remained on his farm and out o f the Patriots’ view, but they 
feared that his challenge to their endeavor would shake the confidence o f those around him, 
those who were less inclined to support the cause but had been converted by the Commission. 
In the view o f the Commission, he needed to be banished. The community was only as strong 
as the weakest individual and dissent could dissolve the foundation o f their new citizenry.
Recognizance and Bail
Oath-taking functioned to separate Patriots from those who were unwilling to declare 
themselves in rebellion o f Britain. By taking an oath to the state, the individual entered into a 
contract to be a part o f the new governing entity. The state would then have legal authority to 
legislate an individual’s behavior and persons were bound to obey its edicts. In addition, as a 
stipulation o f Patriot community membership the oath-taker promised to inform on his or her 
neighbors, in accordance with the language o f the oath. If  voluntary oath taking (or forced 
volunteerism, as the case may have been) failed to instill allegiance to the Patriot government, 
the Commission could put an Albany county resident on recognizance.
If  a person was brought before the board to be examined, ostensibly because of 
suspicious behavior, and if nothing particular was found to incriminate him or her as a 
Loyalist, the individual was released on recognizance. The legal definition o f recognizance is 
“a bond or obligation, entered into and recorded before a court or magistrate, by which a 
person engages him self to perform some act or observe some condition.. .also, a sum o f 
money pledged as a surety for such performance and rendered forfeit by neglect o f it and
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bail.” 115 Recognizance was a promise that a person would return to the court as instructed, 
which was reinforced by money put up by another person. In effect, by bailing a person out, 
the bailer was vouching for the defendant’s level o f trustworthiness; he was also putting his 
own reputation in jeopardy. Both the accused and the recognizant were allowed to roam at 
liberty until called before the board. If  the accused did not meet the terms o f his recognizance, 
the bail was forfeit and the recognizant was held responsible.
In most cases, the recognizance was insurance that the accused person would report 
to his monthly, or otherwise determined, appearances at the board. Here it seems he was re­
interviewed as to his behavior and then released back into the community as long as he was 
not behaving in opposition to the American cause. Sometimes the individual under suspicion 
had to pay an additional surety. There seems to be no particular reason why another surety 
had to be paid, or for that matter, why most people were put on recognizance even when the 
evidence against them was insubstantial.
In one 1778 case, Alexander Anderson was confined in the “W estward” and then 
“brought before the Board and we having examined into the Cause o f his Commitment and 
finding no material Charges against him do order that he be discharged from his Confinement 
on procuring a sufficient Person to become Bail for his future good Behaviour and 
Appearance before any o f the Commissioners when called upon.” 116 The adjective 
“sufficient” was not explained; it could be a person with enough funds to provide bail or a 
person that was o f the correct character. Peter McKotshen put up a surety o f  £100. If 
Anderson were in fact an active Loyalist, the fear o f  Commissioners calling upon him at any 
time to appear would have curtailed his activities (or so the Commission hoped). If  he did not 
respect the Commission then the guilt o f his friend being held responsible for his activities 
should keep him in line.
115 Oxford English Dictionary, “recognizance.”
116 October 16, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 265.
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The psychological bounds o f community were stretched thin; the Commission relied 
on the population to watch each other and report suspicions back to them. When that was 
shown to be effective they made the townspeople responsible for each other’s actions. If a 
patriot community could not be maintained by mutually decided affiliation then it would be 
constructed on fear and social control. Although the goal may have been to create a Patriot 
state, the negative side o f this construction was the forced normalization o f social values 
(allegiance to the new state). The repetitive normalization o f publicly declaring an oath 
reinforced the power o f the committee system and replicated an idealized community body 
both in reality and in the imaginary.
On April 16, 1778 “Moses Dorman, Robert Ferguson, Martin Galer Junr. Mattice 
Galer, Stoffel117 Galer, James Esman[,] David Michel[,] Silvan Galer and Henry Salsbury 
being committed by the Committee o f the District o f Kinderhook and it appearing that they 
are disaffected Persons whose going at large may be dangerous to the Liberties o f 
A m erica...” were ja iled .118 On May 6, Christopher [Stoffel] was brought to the fort due to 
illness.119 Soon David Michael, Martin Galer, Martinus [Mattice] Galer were removed to the 
fort due to overcrowding at the ja il.120 Silvan Galer does not reappear in the records. Martin 
Galer was re-examined on July 6, the charges of disaffection were now accusations o f 
“conveying Intelligence to the Enemy” but these were found to be “rather 111 grounded.” He 
was proclaimed innocent but forced to bail him self out for £100 in addition to the other £100 
that John M anger put up. He was released “into Recognizance for good Behaviour and
117 Stoffel is a Dutch nickname for Christopher. Mattice [Martinus] and Martin, Jr. were 
probably father and son. Throughout these records spellings change. First, different 
secretaries recording the minutes may personally know the defendant and use a more familiar 
name. Also due to the Dutch naming practices Stoffel may have been given to delineate a 
younger Christopher from his namesake. It was not uncommon for Dutch people to use 
multiple names, including nicknames and Anglicized names, on legal documents because the 
community was so small everyone was on a familiar basis.
118 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 87. Kinderhook was a hotbed o f loyalist activities. In the early years 
they raised a militia to join Burgoyne. Kinderhook and Schenectady consistently subverted 
the Patriot government in Albany, both were about 18 miles from Albany, and Albany was in 
the middle.
119 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 107.
120 May 27. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 128-129.
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Monthly Appearances.” 121 Martin Galer continued his punishment into 1780 when he was 
again forced to pay bail to maintain his recognizance “during the continuance o f the present 
war with Great Britain.” 122
James Esman, Robert Ferguson, Mattice [Martinus] Galer, and Christopher [Stoffel] 
Galer do not reappear in the Minutes. Henry Salsbury only re-enters the picture in 1780 when 
he is a witness for a man accused o f disaffection.123 Moses Dorman [Mose Dormen] 
apparently was released after his initial confinement in April 1778. He is mentioned by Isaac 
Lamb as having persuaded him to join Burgoyne’s army in 1777 and then encouraged him to 
stay in New York City during the conflict. But the Commissioners did not re-call Dorman to 
testify about this behavior. Lamb on the other hand, had to have two bailers and was released 
on a £2000 bail, one o f the heaviest fines in the Minutes. In Dorm an’s case the suspicions 
against him were true but the Minutes do not reveal if the Commissioners had discovered this 
for themselves in 1778. By the lack o f an entry, I assume not. All financial transactions seem 
to be recorded, so if Dorman was released on recognizance it should have been entered into 
the Minutes. For most o f the Galer men and Salsbury, they were fortunate to be brought in to 
the Commission so early in the war because as the conflict progressed the Commission 
regularly required recognizance.
David Michael [Davis Michel] is an anomalous case. When he was brought in with 
the Galer men on April 16, 1778 he was probably confined for disaffection or suspicion of 
Toryism. On June 17 the Commissioners state that he “confined on Suspicion o f being 
concerned in the M urder and Robbery o f John Van Ness.” 124 Usually an explicit description 
o f such a large accusation was recorded but for some unknown reason the charge o f murder 
was not entered until M ichael’s release. He apparently was tried by a jury and acquitted. Jurie
121 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 165.
122 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 463.
123 September 17, 1780. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 534-535.
124 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 147.
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Michael, a relative, posted a £200 surety for D avid’s release. David and Martin Galer were 
both required to post a new surety in 1780.125
The example above is one case where a group o f people who appeared together took 
divergent roads. It was a consistent practice o f the commission to list men brought in under 
the same charge for the same crime. Yet each man took a divergent path and received 
different punishments. In some cases the wide net cast by the Commission actually caught 
real Loyalists, but arguably most were not actively pursuing a subversive agenda.
Another method o f controlling the Albany population was spatial control o f the 
social sphere. In some situations, a recognizance was coupled with physical restrictions on the 
person in addition to mandated appearances before the Commission. Intuitively, one would 
look for evidence that physical restrictions meant a higher degree o f disaffection or a more 
substantial threat to the community but the actions o f the individual and the board cannot be 
directly related to the style o f punishment. For example, “Simeon Griggs o f H alf Moon 
having attempted to go to Canada and join the Enemy and having been apprehended” and was 
released to his father on recognizance. His father asked that Simeon be allowed to enter into 
the local militia as insurance on his “future good Conduct.” The Commissioners acceded to 
the request and required him to appear before the board when they called for him. In addition, 
he was to remain “within the Limits o f the District o f H alf Moon unless when called upon to 
do Militia duty which [sic] recognizance to be in full force during the Continuance o f the 
present war with Great Britain.” 126
In a similar case, David Van Shaack reappears in October 1778, after he had already 
been charged with removal from Albany to New York City, due to his disaffection. Governor 
Clinton intervened and the Commission decided to “draw up a parole” where Van Shaack 
could “forthwith repair to Schodack and there remain and abide by such restrictions” as the
125 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 463.
126 July 3, 1780. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 446-447.
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parole defined.127 If  Van Schaack were to leave the bounds o f his parole his neighbors would 
surely inform on him. In May o f the following year, he petitioned the board for “Permission 
on Account o f his 111 State o f Health to ride on Horseback a Mile or two beyond the bounds 
prescribed him by his parole.” 128 The board resolved to consider his request at “some future 
day.” 129 Three weeks later, the lawyer for David Van Schaack’s deceased father petitioned 
that David be allowed to come to Kinderhook to settle the estate. Again, the Commission 
resolved to postpone a decision.130 In June, the Commission allowed him to go to 
Kinderhook.131 Just because Van Shaack had curried favor with Governor Clinton did not 
mean that the Commission was willing to cede its right to punish people on the local level. 
While clearly respecting Clinton’s request the Commission did not go out o f its way to 
accommodate Van Shaack. Throughout the remainder o f the war the board often refused to 
cede their local power in any real sense, especially in the case o f the Van Shaacks’ who were 
notorious Loyalists with many Whig connections.
The function o f the recognizance was twofold— on the one hand, it meant the 
accused person was vouched for and now another person was responsible for his behavior. It 
also meant the bailer had declared his loyalty to the state. Recognizance was based on trust 
and trust could only thrive in personal relationships. At this juncture the Commission had 
shored up its ability to force people to take oaths and then regulate other people’s behaviors. 
The state had gained a measure o f power and legitimacy by creating a situation where the 
populace enforced normative behavior. And at the same time the state was now collecting 
money from the population to fund its growing power in the area. The recourses obtained 
funded the Commissioners, Rangers, and larger patriot movement in New Y ork.132
127 October 30, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 269.
128 May 8, 1779. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 339.
129 May 8, 1779. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 339.
130 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 350.
131 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 352.
132 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, financial appendix, 802-837.
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Exile and Enemy Lines
Removal to the enem y’s lines was a practice in effect from the beginning o f the war
until the end. In the early stages o f the war, as allegiances formed out o f the nebulous politics,
some people chose to join the local militia and some to join the British troops. The ability to
define one’s own allegiance was more fluid in the earlier years especially before the
Commission and the state solidified its rights and powers. The following passage
demonstrates where the abilities o f the Commission lay on May 15, 1778.
Respecting the Situation o f the Families in A rgile133 who have returned to 
the respective Habitations and are under a Tie o f Nutrality [sic] to the 
British King[.] it is the Opinion o f this Board that their Numbers are too 
large to be removed or dealt with in a rigorous Manner[.] therefore as 
Humanity has always been a particular Character o f the Americans and 
Freedom incompatible with using Severity to Woomen [sic] and Children 
who otherwise might be culpable for the Crimes o f their Parents &
Husbands[.] it may be justifiable in the Opinion o f this Board to cause the 
said Delinquents (who have been regardless o f their Country’s Freedom & 
destitute o f  Feeling for their Posterity) to come before them and represent to 
them their Crimes and the Difficulties that will attend their being reinstated 
in the Benefits and Priveledges that every faithful Subject will enjoy under 
a free Constitution^] also to enquire if  any have engaged to take up Arms 
against the united states & finally to take an Oath o f Nutrality from them in 
Behalf o f the States whereby they must engage if  possible to give every Aid 
and Assistance in their Power to the states excepting bearing Arms[.] and by 
no Means give or cause to be given any Aid or Comfort to the Enemies o f 
the States but from Time to Time give such Intelligence to the Authority o f 
the State as may come to their Knowledge respecting all and every 
Transaction as may come to their Knowledge o f the Enemy[,] their 
Emissaries[,] Aiders[,] Abettors or Spies[.]134
This passage provides several insights to the Albany com m ission’s perception o f itself, the 
larger struggle the Commission felt a part of, and its ability to legislate and govern the people 
in the county. First, the Commission’s discussion o f the “American Character” highlights the 
psychological core o f a body that was trying to create unity and positive identification across 
ethnic and religious diversities. The Commission argues that Great Britain would never 
welcome people who previously were loyal to the other side back into the fold, but New York
133 Argyle, New York, is about 60 miles north o f Albany. It was part o f a larger Scotch Patent, 
most immigrants had only settled there in the 1760s. Most o f the Scottish settlers were 
Loyalists and/or Vermont separatists.
134 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 117-118.
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would, and the state would even exempt them from military service because the new state is 
so understanding o f their previous loyalties. Not only was the American character different 
from the English character, posits the Commission, but the foundation o f freedom was a 
protective Constitution. Here, one sees the language o f political persuasion in action. The 
board, in other words, was portraying itself as driven by ideal that would not be abandoned 
under the stress o f war.
The wording o f this passage also exemplifies the early notion o f what the inhabitants 
o f  New York were going to be— subjects; the Argyle residents were to be incorporated as 
“subjects.” Citizenship as a concept had not been fleshed out in 1778, but by the end o f the 
war, the Commission had formed a citizenry out o f former British subjects. Most importantly, 
this passage reveals the limitations o f  the New York state government in 1778 and the 
Commission’s ability to enforce the Patriot government’s legislation on the ground. The 
Commission decided that the resident’s “numbers were too large” to move or to punish 
effectively. The Commission did not have enough manpower to confiscate the land and 
remove the inhabitants to the enemy lines. Nor did it have enough influence in the county in 
the spring o f 1778, to allow the other residents to socially ostracize the Argyle residents. The 
other tactics, such as recognizance, bail, and oaths were just beginning to be implemented in a 
regular fashion. Exile at the start o f the war was more difficult to enforce while the Patriot 
government was just beginning and the citizenry was not fully allied with the American 
mission. At this point in 1778, a lax oath, one that just required neutrality, inaction, and no 
demonstrative loyalty to New York was the best the Commission could order, but as noted 
above, the oath would be a powerful force in the new society.
Removing the most blatant offenders o f the American Cause to the enemy lines was
not the only type o f exile the Commission undertook. They also banished people from their
home communities. The community was the core o f the person’s life— his or her family,
reputation, and livelihood was in this geographic space. If  an individual was removed from
this society his or her’s sphere o f influence collapsed. In one case, the Albany commission
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was a recipient o f a banished person. “Received a Letter from the Commissioners o f Charlotte
County informing that they sent to us under Guard William Moffat who was last Summer
with the Enemy and whose remaining there may prove dangerous to the Safety o f the State.”
He was ordered into recognizance in Albany, confined to the city, and “to behave him self in a
becoming M anner.” 135 In most cases the Commission did the banishing.
The Commission banishments revolved around legislation such as the Act to enable
the Persons administering the Government o f  this State fo r  the Time being, to remove certain
disaffected and dangerous Persons and Families. This act was passed in April 1778 and
allowed any government committee to remove people to another location in the state, and sell
or rent their lands with the proceeds going to Patriot coffers. The act also states that wherever
the disaffected were moved they would not be allowed to become residents of their new
counties, effectively disenfranchising them .136
In addition to banishments, people applied for permission to leave the Patriot
territory. In early October 1778 three women, for example, approached the Commissioners
and asked permission to leave the county for British territory.
Mrs. McDonald and Miss McDonald o f Johnstown appeared before the 
Board and requested from us Permission to go the Former to New York to 
the Latter to C anada.. .The Board having taken the above Request into 
Consideration and judging that it would be more beneficial to the State to 
permit the said Mrs. McDonald & Miss McDonald (whose Husband and 
Father are gone over to the Enemy) to go there also than to keep them here 
do order it that it be recommended to General Stark to grant them Passes for 
the above Purpose.137
Mrs. Sarah McMichael appeared before the Board and prayed that a Pass 
might be granter her to go with her Family to New York and as a Reason to 
induce us to grant her such Permission she alledged that one o f her Sons is 
in New York and that she looks upon him as her greatest Support...a 
certificate granted her signifying this Board having no Objections to her 
going to New York with her Fam ily.138
135July 29, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 183.
136 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 781.
137 October 1, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 249.
138 October 3, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 252.
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These women, and others, were able to leave Albany because they would be a burden to the 
British army, and their husbands, and would further strain the limited resources o f the 
occupied territory. In addition, New York State confiscated their property and assets. The 
effects o f banishment in the locality were even greater. The Commission kept a list o f all 
people who had gone to the enemy, were suspected of having any interaction with the enemy, 
or behaved in a suspicious manner. The threat o f banishment bifurcated society by 
involuntarily firming the A lbanian’s allegiances. The Commission was exercising its growing 
power, delineating the bounds o f community by exorcising the unwanted elements. The apex 
o f the Commission’s power lay not just in their ability to re-shape the community from within 
but in its authority to decide who could be in and outside o f the community.
Even when observing European war etiquette, the Commission managed to burden 
the enemy. For example a prisoner exchange on October 15, 1778, also included disaffected 
exiles.
Alen McDonald Appeared before the Board and requested Permission to go 
to Canada and it appearing to us from his own Information that his 
Relations who are with the Enemy are Men o f Influence and as such have it 
in their Power to procure some Person to be exchanged for him ...139
Prisoner exchange may seem equal but with every flag o f truce the Commission sent more
women and children with the British officers. So for every one enemy officer sent back to aid
his army, a few newly impoverished families, were sent along to burden the British.
Earlier in the war the Commissioners equivocated about sending women to be with
their enemy-combatant husbands. In 1778, for example, “Mrs. Debby Wall [who] appeared
before the Board and applied for a Pass to go to Unadilla to her Husband” was rejected. The
Commission responded “that she be informed that no permit or Indulgence can be given by
the Board to any part o f a Family w hereof the Husband or Master has so far deviated from
humane principles or to associate with Barbarians & assisting in Imbruing his Hands o f the
139 October 15, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 258.
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Blood o f  Women and Children and peaceable Inhabitants.” 140 But soon it became apparent 
that the punishment was really on the state o f  New York for keeping these families. Within a 
month o f Mrs. W all’s application, “Mrs W rag o f  Fort Miller, Catharina Rederpach and Mary 
England whose husbands are at this Time with the Enemy at Canada made Application to the 
Board for Permission to go to Canada with their Families.” What influenced the 
Commission’s change o f policy was that “those Women are become chargeable to the 
Districts in which they severally reside and that they together with their Families are subsisted 
at the Public Expense.” 141 In this case, the Commission faced the reality o f the war before 
state legislation could address it. In this way the committee system was a dialogic enterprise, 
where local and state governments mutually reinforced their legitimacies, by relying on each 
other to alternately enforce and create new legislation to reflect local, or regional, realities.
1780 was arguably one o f the worst years in the American war for independence.
The British were particularly successful in the Southern theater, destroying an American army 
at Camden, South Carolina at the same time they continued to occupy New York City and a 
rise in Loyalism and disaffection occurred in New Y ork’s countryside. Even symbols of 
American power and success, such as Robert Morris, a fundraiser and banker, and Benedict 
Arnold, although his most heinous crimes were yet to be uncovered, were being scrutinized in 
early 1780.
As New York became war weary, some people switched sides and others withdrew 
from the conflict. Out o f this atmosphere o f stress and turmoil came the passage o f the Act fo r  
the Removal o f  Families o f  a person who has jo in ed  the Enemy, passed on July 1, 1780. The 
legislature noted “great mischiefs do arise” when disaffected persons were allowed to be 
“concealed and comforted by their respective families.” 142 The Justices o f the Peace for each 
ward in the district were told to give the wives o f disloyal men twenty days to go to the enemy 
lines. The women were not to take any children above the age o f twelve with them. If the
140 August, 31, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 220.
141 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 237-239.
142 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, Appendix, 794.
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women did not depart within twenty days they were no longer to be considered “out o f the 
Protection o f the laws o f this state; and shall be liable to be proceeded against as Enemies of 
the Unites States.” 143 Threatening these women and their families with charges o f treason 
appears on the surface to have been harmful to the American cause. Women were not 
considered independent members o f the society, and were viewed as part o f their husband’s 
property. Yet the state held them and their families responsible for their husband’s political 
affiliations. Although for the protection o f women, the state legislature did allow those who 
“procured permits to remain at their respective habitations” from any three o f the 
Commissioners, the commissioners were only instructed to give permits to women who “they 
may esteem o f good character and not dangerous to the Liberties and Independence o f this, 
and the United States.” 144
By 1780, the Patriot government was strapped for cash and the Continental and local 
militias lacked adequate manpower. The state government wanted to prove both that it could 
claim the land and the allegiance o f the people who supported it and could remove those who 
opposed it. 1780 was not the first time removals were ordered for disaffected people but it 
was the first time a cohesive effort was made to consolidate the Loyal population and clamp
i
down on the Patriot community. In the minds o f the New York state legislators, the military 
exigencies o f the situation required that all people who were American submit to the 
American cause and all others who did not respect this government had to be 
excommunicated to keep the Independence movement afloat.
Efficacy of Tactics
The Patriot government was deeply rooted in the community from which it 
originated but it possessed a different political framework and agenda from the royal
143 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, Appendix, 794.
144 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, Appendix, 794.
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government. The terms o f  the commission’s power were negotiable. Although the 
Commission was engaged in molding a new society, it had to obey certain social norms that 
were historically and morally foundational. Some based on common perceptions o f human 
decency did not change— removal from prison for illness or death or to support a destitute 
family were routine procedures. These elements were integral to the fabric o f society and 
preventing a person from performing basic functions would have been unacceptable.
Sometimes men were released from prison to care for a sick relative, conduct 
familial business, or to go back to work so their families would not fall prey to poverty. On 
August 2, 1780 “Andries Stoll who was some time ago committed to Gaol as a dangerous and 
disaffected person was brought before the Board and we having certain information that his 
wife is in a very distressed situation without the benefit o f any aid or assistance and expecting 
shortly to be brought to bed... released [Stoll] from his Confinement.” 145 O f course he was 
released on a £200 recognizance to his neighbor and had to take an oath o f allegiance, but he 
still was able to attend his wife. A Dr. George Smith had been confined to his house in 
Albany because o f his “disaffected character” but since he was a doctor— an occupation that 
required travel in order to be an effective service provider— he petitioned the board to 
consider the “distressed Situation o f his Family by means o f his being confined to his House.” 
He was released in recognized, confined to the Albany city limits, and ordered not to have 
correspondence “upon Political Matters during that Time which may in any manner be 
prejudicial to the United States.” 146
On September 19, 1778 the Commissioners recorded, “It having been suggested to 
the Board by the Gaoler that Mrs. Cole is very 111 and that her Life is greatly endangered by 
Reason o f her Confinement— Ordered that she have Permission to remove to some House in 
the City until she shall again have recovered her Health,” 147 Four days later, the 
Commissioner released Peter Wheeler to his brother because he was sick. The same day the
145 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 478.
146 November 6, 1780. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 561.
147 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 237.
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Commission recorded “Daniel Price a prisoner now confined...has lately received a Fall on
his Breast which it is supposed will be the Occasion o f his Death.” 148 Price was released on
£400 bail and ordered back to jail by September 29, if he did not die. Men like Daniel Price
was not unique— others such as, “Paul Drew who was some Time since sent to the Hospital is
so well recovered from his Illness that he may with Safety be again Confined.” 149
Occasionally the Minutes reveal cases o f a humane nature. Although the political and
military situation precipitated enormous suffering some people remained considerate in their
treatment o f others. John Bratt [Bradt], a farmer from Hellebergh, was confined for allegedly
allowing a Tory to visit his home. On September 1, 1780 he petitioned the board for release:
“On account o f his age & infirmities that he be released on his taking an oath not to comfort
or aid or assist any o f the enemies o f the United States and to make known to us all persons
coming from the enemy who secrete themselves in the woods.” 150 He was released to two
friends for £300 and required to report to the board until the end o f the war. If  age and
infirmity could get a person out o f jail, then insanity could get a man out o f jail free. On
September 6, 1780
John Johnson o f the State o f Connecticut appeared before the Board and 
laid before us a letter from Col. William B. Whiting o f Kings District 
wherein the said Col. Whiting request’s that Samuel Johnson who was the 
other day confined by M ather Adgate Esqr. For dissuading the inhabitants 
o f this State to take up Arms in defence o f the Country may be delivered 
over to the said John Johnson his Brother as he believes o f the former 
character o f the said Samuel Johnson that he is at present Insane.
Samuel Johnson was released without bail to his brother but he was “cautioned against
coming in this State whilst he persists in inculcating such dangerous and destructive
Principles.” 151 The hand o f behavioral control was tempered with adherence to normative
cultural behaviors.
148 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 239.
149 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 242. He was recommitted.
150 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 512-513.
151 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 517-518.
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A noticeable shift in the boundaries between private behavior and the state-regulated
public conduct occurred in 1779. Previously, disaffection and proximity to the enemy were
reviewed in terms o f the plausibility o f the person having assisted the British or Indian allies
or having knowledge o f their actions. Familial correspondence was sometimes reviewed by
the Commission but in general was allowed to continue. This policy was in conflict with
removing people for being related to a Loyalist. The reasons why some activities were
allowed or some people were permitted to perform them and others were not remain
unknown. There was a turning point in late 1779 when familial correspondence became
suspicious and new regulations were placed on this type o f contact with the enemy.
The new action taken against familial correspondence was precipitated by
complaints from local Albanians.
From the frequent complaints which are exhibited to this Board that the 
wives o f such disaffected Persons who are gone over to the Enemy daily 
harbour Persons who through fear o f  being punished for their Crimes 
against the State conceal themselves & their holding Correspondance with 
their Husbands[.] it is conceived necessary that some mode should be 
adopted to prevent this ev il.. . 152
Soon correspondence was a restricted part o f the recognizance punishments and ordinary 
people like the Church family o f Brattleborough would come under suspicion. A warrant for 
Timothy Church, Jonathan Mills Church, and Comfort Joy Church was issued because they 
“have held a Correspondence and kept up an Intercourse with a certain Oliver Church now an 
Officer in the British Army.” 153 Timothy was a captain in the local militia, Jonathan Mills 
seems to have been pro-American, and his other relative who was called to testily— Jonathan 
Church— was a lieutenant in the Cumberland County militia. Apparently they were keeping in 
touch with their brother. Hence, the Committee put them on recognizance for the rest o f the 
war on their “good behaviour” which now meant no correspondence with O liver.154
152 April 12, 1779. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 327.
153 October 17, 1780. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 549.
154 October 30, 1780. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 559.
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The Com m ission’s methods o f  social control were successful because they 
effectively identified and removed the challengers to its authority. Similarly, the Commission 
had deepened its hold on the community, encouraging constituents to inform on one another. 
The Church family, for example, was turned into the board by a neighbor. As the components 
o f recognizance were enforced upon larger segments o f the society the Commission reaped 
the rewards o f an acquiescent population. The governing structure was legitimate because it 
was a constitutionally legislated body and because the constituents were beginning to view it 
as such.
By October 1778, Albany county residents were sharply divided and they recognized
that one disaffected character could bring suspicion upon the whole community. The
community was an intertwined network o f kinship and personal relationships, and one person
could easily bring down many by association.
A Petition was laid before the Board signed by a Number o f Persons living 
at Spencertown wherein they set forth that Thomas Clark who was some 
Time since discharged from Confinement by us is a Person who from his 
Conduct last Year in going to the Enemy has rendered him self so odious to 
the Inhabitants o f that District that they are determined not to let him remain 
among them, that his Behaviour since he has been liberated from 
Confinement in associating with Persons who are notoriously disaffected 
has given them further Cause for Disatisfaction and praying us we may 
order the said Thomas Clark to be again im prisoned.155
This example illuminates the nature o f  the power o f  the Commission to get others to
police the community. It also reveals the limitations o f the power o f the oaths, and
recognizance to re-shape the minds o f those who were Loyalist. A steadfast Loyalist
would remain so regardless o f coercive action and the board could do little to
determine the sincerity o f  the professed beliefs at its examinations other than to rely
on the community members to vouch for the examinee or to corroborate the
accusations.
Unfortunately for the inhabitants o f  Spencertown the Commission decided 
that it was “altogether Inconvenient to confine the said Thomas Clark” due to disease 
155 October 2, 1778. Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 249.
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and overcrowding in the Albany jail. But they did order that Clark “make such 
Concessions to the Inhabitants o f that District as they shall think proper to require of 
him and that it be recommended to the Inhabitants o f the said District to consent to 
his remaining among them on his making the said Concessions.” 156
This type o f petition was frequent as the war progressed. In November 1778 
a tavern keeper named Aron Drummond was called “a Person disaffected to the 
Cause o f America.” Apparently, the “worshipful John Barclay esqr.” presented 
papers to the Commissioners given to him by “George White esqr. and a Number of 
other Persons setting forth” this accusation. They “praye[ed] that he may not be 
permitted any longer to keep a Tavern.” 157 This petition was taken under advisement 
but no decision was recorded in the Minutes.
Communal surveillance was taken seriously, both by those watching their 
neighbors and by the Commissioners. For example, in December 1780 an 
“anonimous letter directed to the Commissioners for Conspiracies was laid before 
the Board setting forth that John Cobham is a Dangerous Person and that his going to 
the Northward gives great Reason to suspect that he Conveys Intelligence to the 
Enemy.” Based on that letter alone “on no pretence whatever” would Cobham be 
allowed “to leave this City.” 158 During the war idle gossip was interrogated, as each 
piece o f knowledge about any person’s movements, commercial activities, or 
religious gatherings could be a time to exchange information related to war activities.
There were Commissions for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in all o f the 
states working within the committee system, both locally and across the former British 
colonies. Within New York the spread o f Patriotism due to the Com m ission’s activities in 
Albany County meant that as the recognizance networks widened, the need for consistent and 
evenly applied justice was demanded o f the Patriot government. On July 15, 1780 the Albany
156 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 248.
157 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 279.
158 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 594.
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Commission decided to “open a board at Newtown” because some inhabitants had 
complained about lawlessness. The Albany Commission further observed that it would “bring 
them [Newtonians] to a sence o f their duty and to confine such o f them as are most 
dangerous.” 159 Although the Commission had previously noted the high numbers o f Loyalists 
in that area, it waited until the town residents asked for a governing body. The quest for 
legitimacy was making a subtle transition from rebel tactics to respected body; the transition 
from extra-legal to legal had to occur in the minds o f the area residents as well as in the 
structure o f the governing community.
As the powers o f each commission grew locally they were able to enforce other 
board’s decisions, making a network o f overlapping Patriot strongholds the basis for interstate 
loyalties. In addition to other commissions operating in New York, the Albany board 
maintained correspondence with Pennsylvania and Connecticut Patriot governments and 
conspiracy commissions. As early as November 1778 the Albany Commissioners received a 
letter “from the honorable Mathew Greswold Esqr. Lieutenant Governor o f the State o f 
Connecticut., .wherein he informs us that pursuant to an Order o f this Board Bethuel Huntley 
had appeared before him.” 160 Through a complicated system o f character certificates, all 
travelers had to obtain passes to move about the country. Once a person left his home 
territory, out o f  the eyesight o f his neighbors and local government, he immediately became a 
suspected Loyalist. Traveling was discouraged, enforcing patriot authority to govern those 
who stayed. For those who moved about accountability to other Patriot Commissions 
increased the power and legitimacy o f the local board to direct an individual’s behavior.
It is unquestionable that there were conspiracies against the American War for 
Independence and local Patriot governing bodies. Tories did lurk about in wom en’s clothes 
concealed by New York loyalists,161 Quakerism was a cover for political dissuasion,162 and
159 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 460.
160 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 281.
161 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 563. “John Docksteder o f Try on County did last Spring take into his 
House a wounded Soldier o f Sir John Johnson’s Party and that he did after the said Soldier
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men were hiding in the woods to avoid conscription.163 All o f  these actions reveal challenges 
to the authority o f the authorities in Albany.
The Commission was a crucial mediator between the state congress, the continental 
congress, and the people o f  New York. To create the new state, this body had to re-frame the 
manner in which the inhabitants o f New York viewed themselves as they transitioned from 
subjects o f England to members o f a new state, and citizens o f Albany. The process of 
subjecthood to citizenship in Albany was coercive; the limits o f voluntarily allegiance were 
clearly demarcated as the Patriot government went from de facto rebel organization to a 
viable, legitimate government. Importantly for historians o f the American Revolution, this 
process o f forced oath-taking, recognizance, and communal surveillance was not limited to 
Albany, New York. The Commission fo r  Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in Albany 
County reveals a dialogic model for early nation-state creation in which local committees 
played a central role in creating and replicating structures o f  power and legitimacy.
was recovered for some time keep him in his House in wom an’s Cloath’s until he made his 
Escape to C anada...” November 8, 1780.
162 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 564. “A Number o f disaffected Persons have o f late associated back 
o f Cooksakie under a Pretence o f worship but that he is well persuaded from the Political 
Characters o f  the said persons and other Circumstances that such meetings are only held to 
Deliberate upon such Matters as may tend to injure the American Cause.” November 9, 1780.
163 Paltsits, ed. Minutes, 587. “Peter Waley o f the Hellebergh is a disaffected Person and that 
he conceals him self in the woods to Escape doing Militia and other Duty.” November 27, 
1780.
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